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Abstract 
The paper studies the relative effect between two groups, a treatment group of low-wage workers and a 
control group of high-wage workers, when a minimum wage reform is introduced. The empirical 
analysis uses a rich dataset from the Greek labor market over the period between 2010 and 2020. The 
study examines whether the employees’ responses and the potential effects of two different minimum 
wage reforms on unemployment were heterogenous. Our results are straightforward: among the two 
groups, the relative possibility of job loss is associated with an increase in the minimum wage, while 
the relative possibility of job search difficulty is strongly affected by a minimum wage cut. The former 
result is getting worse for employees who engaged in a minimum wage-intensive sector in the previous 
year and are now inactive. The latter result is reinforced for very young workers. 
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1. Introduction 
 The debate among economists regarding the implications of minimum wage reforms has not been 
arranged so far (see e.g., Manning, 2021). The vast majority of recent literature discusses mainly the 
employment effects from minimum wage increases; however, decreases may also provide insightful 
evidence for the labor market.  
 The employment effects of the minimum wage are analyzed by the economic theory taking into 
consideration the structure of the labor market. In a perfect competitive market setting a wage above the 
market clearing level causes employment to decline. This result stems from the hypothesis that firms 
are price takers, i.e., face a perfectly elastic labor supply curve. By contrast, in a monopolistic market 
the firms are able to offer wages below the competitive level. If the government introduces a binding 
minimum wage above the monopolistic level but lower than the competitive level, the employment 
increases (Boeri and Van Ours, 2008).  Regarding the empirical investigation of the impact of minimum 
wage on employment it seems that by the early 1980s there was a consensus that higher minimum wages 
decrease employment (Brown et al., 1982). The seminal work of Card and Krueger (1994) followed the 
work of Card (1992a, 1992b) seemed to have dented the view that higher minimum wages decrease 
employment by producing evidence that of no or even positive employment effects of minimum wage. 
Despite this, there have been divergent views on the employment effects of minimum wage (Neumark, 
2018). The findings of Card and Krueger (1995) caused an intense controversy on the employment 
effects of minimum wage (Card and Krueger, 1995 and 2000; Machin and Manning, 1997; Manning, 
2003; Neumark et al., 2014; Totty, 2017). Neumark and Shirley (2021) explored what conclusions can 
de drawn from the literature focusing on the use of subminimum wage and they found that negative 
estimates of employment elasticities in the literature are predominant. They also found that the negative 
employment effect is stronger for teens and young adults and more so for the less-educated.  
A number of studies of the employment effects of minimum wage is from Europe. The results for 
Portugal (Pereira, 2003; Portugal and Cardoso, 2006), Hungary (Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019) and for 
Ireland (O’ Neill et al., 2006) seem to converge to the conclusion that large increases in minimum wages 
in countries where the level of minimum wages is relatively high have no or have small negative 
employment effects.  
As far as the Greek case is concerned, there are few studies investigating the employment effects 
of minimum wages in the decades of 90s and 2000s. Koutsogeorgopoulou (1994) finds a small negative 
employment elasticity of male and female industrial workers regarding minimum wages. Kapopoulos 
et al. (2003) and Karageorgiou (2004) failed to document the negative effects. There are few more recent 
studies (Yannelis, 2014; Karakitsos, 2015; Kakoulidou et al., 2018; Georgiadis et al., 2018; 
Kanellopoulos, 2015) investigated the impact of the employment effects of 2012 reform on minimum 
wages.  The data used to analyze the impact of minimum wages on employment are data from the Greek 
Labour Force Survey (Yannelis, 2014; Karakitsos, 2015; Kakoulidou et al., 2018), data from a random 
sample of employees in the private sector and the employers drawn from the Unified Social Security 
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Authority (Georgiadis et al., 2018) and from published IKA statistical data (Kanellopoulos, 2015). There 
is one more study (Andriopoulou and Karakitsos, 2021) which investigated the determinants of the 
unemployment dynamics and the impact of the minimum wage on the probability of making a transition 
into and out of unemployment for the period 2004 – 2019 using data of the Greek Labour Force Survey 
for the above period. Yannelis (2014) found that the differentiation of minimum wage through the 
binding of the subminimum wage enhances employment through the substitution channel between 
workers below and above 25 years old. Kakoulidou et al. (2018) do not find significant changes in 
employment probability between the age groups below and above 25 years old. They find a significant 
positive impact on job-finding rate and no on job losses. Karakitsos (2015) shows that the employment 
rate for 20 -24 year-old employees declined less than the corresponding rate for "older" employees. This 
could imply a positive impact of the sub-minimum wage on youth employment. Kannelopoulos (2015) 
also finds that minimum wages reduce employment for both genders. Georgiadis et al. (2020) do not 
find systematic employment effects of the existence of a minimum wage. Andriopoulou and Karakitsos 
(2021) do not find any causal relationship between minimum wage changes and transitions out of 
unemployment seem to be slightly positively affected by increases in minimum wage.  
This paper aims to evaluate the employment effects of the two reforms on minimum wages in 2012 
and in 2019 in the case of Greece. The first reform is characterized by the huge reduction of the minimum 
wage and the introduction of the subminimum wage and second reform abolishes the subminimum wage 
and increases the minimum wage.  We differ from the other papers concerning the Greek case as we 
take into account the two opposite reforms on the level of minimum wage and we study the impact of 
these reforms not on employment / unemployment level but on job search rate and on the job loss rate.  
 In this respect, the current study focuses on the relative unemployment effects between two groups, 
a treatment group of females aged 15-44 who attended at most secondary education (a low-wage group) 
and a control group of males aged 45-64 who completed at least the secondary education (a high-wage 
group), from a minimum wage reduction and increase in 2012 and 2019, respectively in Greece. Through 
this study, the following questions are going to be considered: Are the relative unemployment effects 
on job loss and job search difficulty homogenous when a minimum wage reform has introduced? May 
be these effects reinforced by specific employment characteristics? 
 In this paper, by using data from the Hellenic Statistical Authority’s Greek Labor Force Survey 
over the period between 2010 and 2020, we estimate the relative possibility, between the two groups 
reported before, of the unemployment effects from the imposition of two minimum wage reforms; both 
reforms have been established in a demanding period for Greece, a country that has experienced a 
sovereign debt crisis at the early years of the previous decade and led to a fiscal consolidation lasting 
for more than 7 years. Based on our findings, between the two groups, a minimum wage cut in 2012 is 
strongly associated with a reduction in the relative possibility of job search difficulty that further drops 
for very young employees (15-24 years old). Additionally, among these groups, the relative possibility 
of job loss is negatively affected by a minimum wage increase in 2019; the harmful effects are getting 
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worse for employees who worked in a minimum wage-intensive sector in the previous year and who 
decide not to search for a job in the current period. 
 The contribution of our paper to the labor economics literature is two-fold. First, a natural 
experiment is used to show that the differentiated impact on unemployment effects has been established 
when a minimum wage cut and increase, respectively have been introduced. In particular, it seems that 
a minimum wage reform that either increases or decreases the minimum wage does not have 
homogenous influence on the relative possibility of job loss and job search difficulty when low-wage 
and high-wage groups are considered. Second, the paper analyzes employment dynamics by using probit 
models for job loss and job search difficulty and also a difference-in-difference estimation strategy 
which uncovers the differentiated impact of minimum wage reforms between the two groups. Finally, 
the empirical results remain unchanged or reinforced when a number of robustness tests are applied 
either by focusing on very young workers or putting emphasis on the previous year job status. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as below. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 
displays the data and specifies the research questions and the empirical model. Section 4 analyzes the 
empirical results and Section 5 carries out robustness analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data analysis 
 The data used in the empirical analysis stem from the Hellenic Statistical Authority’s Greek Labor 
Force Survey (HSAGLFS) that includes more than 30,000 households corresponding to more than 
60,000 individuals per quarter. The participation in this quarterly survey is obligatory, lasts for 6 quarters 
(1/6 of households are replaced in each period) and accounts for more than 90% of households selected. 
The survey collects data on a wide range of labor characteristics inter alia employment, wage, 
professional status, job distinction, educational level and demographics among them the respondent’s 
age. 
 Following the standard OECD definition of the working age population, we drop from our dataset 
all individuals aged 0-14 and 65+ years old; besides, in our dataset, the employment rate of the latter 
age group is less than 5%, including mainly pensioners. To control for potential seasonality of the 
number of employed persons, we keep only the 2nd quarter in the final sample. 
 
2.1. Descriptive statistics of the employment rate 
 As discussed before, the final sample includes the working age population between 15 and 64 years 
old who are either employed, unemployed or inactive1 over the period between 2010q2 and 2020q2; 
employed are 220,419, unemployed are 54,634 and inactive are 137,419. Table 3.1 below provides 
important information both for demographical and employment level characteristics. As for the 
demographics, the employment rate, i.e., the ratio of employed divided by the total population per group, 
 
1 An inactive person is in the working-age group but is not available or looking for work.  
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is displayed, while regarding the employment features an involvement rate is calculated as the number 
of employed per group divided by the total number of employed in each period. 
 
[Please insert Table 3.1] 
 
 A deep dive into specific aspects of Table 3.1 gives us that the employment rate of the whole 
sample shows an average value of 53.68 ranging between 48.93% and 58.94% over the sample period. 
Below we will discuss the employment rate per demographical group. For instance, based on gender, on 
average, the males’ employment rate is much higher than that of females by almost 19%; at the same 
time, 57.82% of employed persons are males (127,435) and the rest are females (92,984). The most 
important classification in our analysis is the employment rate per age group. On average, the age group 
with the highest involvement in the labor market is that of 45-64 (48%), followed by 30-44 (40%) and 
15-29 (12%). However, the highest employment rate is shown by 30-44 (70.22%), followed by 45-64 
(54.17%) and 15-29 (30.34%). The age group with the highest volatility is that of 15-29 (the standard 
deviation equals 4.39); perhaps, the establishment of two reforms may change significantly the number 
of employed persons who get paid with minimum wage within this group and, on average, equals 37% 
of the employed population in this group. We also divide our dataset according to International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED 97). Based on this classification, it seems that almost 80% of 
employed population have attended either secondary or tertiary education. An interesting issue is that 
the employment rate follows a reverse order in relation to the educational level; employed population 
with post-tertiary education has the highest rate (82.39%), while population with no school attainment 
has the lowest rate (23.31%). In other words, higher education level may lead to a much higher 
possibility to get a job. Further, Greek territory has been divided into 13 regions following Nomenclature 
d’ Unités Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS 2). As expected, Attica has about 25% of the employed 
population in Greece; however, Attica is not 1 of the 4 regions with the highest employment rates (close 
to 60%) among them Ionian Islands, Peloponnese, Southern Aegean and Crete. For the rest of regions, 
the employment rate lies between 49% and 56%. 
 We further proceed to employment characteristics. As for them, since we have data only for 
employed population, we present in Table 3.1 the involvement rate per group. Initially, based on job 
distinction, full-time employees account for 92% of the employed population. Considering the 
professional status, employees are 61% of the employed population, followed by self-employees with 
34%, while the rest is family workers. Finally, the Hellenic economy has been split into 16 different job 
sectors according to 2008’s Statistical Distribution and Economic Activity.2 We observe that 5 sectors 
 
2 The following sectors are included in our analysis: primary sector, processing, energy, construction, 
trade, transport, accommodation and food, information, financial and insurance activities, professional-
scientific-technical activities, administrative and supporting activities, public administration, education, 
human health and social support, art and entertainment, and other services.  
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accumulate more than 60% of the total employment that displayed in order i.e., primary sector, trade, 
processing, accommodation and food, and public administration. Finally, among the most volatile 
sectors are accommodation and food, and primary sector in which the employed persons are mostly paid 
with a minimum wage and as such, these sectors may be affected more by the minimum wage reforms. 
 Descriptive statistics offer useful information regarding the employment rates per group in the 
Greek economy; however, they do not unveil the intertemporal fluctuation of these rates. Thus, in the 
following sub-section, we put emphasis on the evolution of the employment and investigate, to what 
extent, different aspects of this variable may be affected by formal changes in the minimum wage. 
 
2.2. Identifying the consequences from the minimum wage reforms 
 Since June 2012, the nominal minimum wage in Greece fell down from 752€ to 586€ (a 22% 
decrease)3, remaining at this level till the end of 2018, and raised to 650€ (an 11% increase)4. Figure 3.1 
depicts the evolution of nominal minimum wage (in a 12-month period) in Greece over the period 
between 2010 and 2020; the two vertical red lines show the minimum wage reforms (June 2012 and 
January 2019). 
 
[Please insert Figure 3.1] 
 
 To shed some light on the effect of the two minimum wage reforms on the Greek labor market, 
Figure 3.2 below displays the evolution of the employment rate in Greece between 2010 and 2020; it 
shows the 2nd quarter of each year. The employment rate has been calculated per period by dividing the 
number of employed with the population 15-64. 
 
[Please insert Figure 3.2] 
 
 By getting a closer look at Figure 3.2, the employment rate decreases till 2013 by losing almost 
10% from the beginning of our sample period, then increases up to 2019 and finally, drops again. In 
particular, the first reform stops the intense drop of employment rate that gradually starts to increase 
after two years from the initial establishment; instead, a direct decline in the employment rate is followed 
by the official increase of the minimum wage at the beginning of 2019. Perhaps the benefit from the 
first reform on the employment rate is more than 2% or 6% after one or two years from its imposition, 
respectively (by considering the pre-2012 downward trend of the employment rate, in 2014, this rate 
would be less than 45%). Instead, the potential cost of the second reform on the employment rate is 
more than 2% after one year from this reform (by taking into account the pre-2019 upward trend of the 
 
3 A 32% minimum wage cut was also introduced to employees younger than 25 years old. 
4 National minimum wage is calculated in a 14-month period. The minimum wage values in a 12-month 
period are 877€, 684€ and 758€, respectively. 
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employment rate, in 2020, this rate would be close to 58%).5 Therefore, concerning the employment 
rate, one could say that the potential cost of the second reform might partially crowd out the potential 
benefits from the first reform. 
 
2.3. Detecting the minimum wage profile 
 Having discussed the effect of minimum wage reforms on the total employment rate in the Greek 
labor market, we need to delve more into this effect by shedding some light on other aspects of labor 
market. Before doing that, it is important to get a better sense of the minimum wage profile. As for the 
income statement reported in HSAGLFS, the percentage of employed persons who has answered this 
question is around 45%. Their answer is classified into 10 different income groups, inter alia up to 400€, 
400€-600€ and 600€-800€. Thus, to define the minimum wage profile, we include respondents with 
monthly payments in the first two groups (the amount does not exceed 600€), except for the pre-2012 
and post-2019 minimum wage reform periods, in which we also add the last income group (the amount 
is up to 800€). Thus, the following Table 3.2 gives us important information concerning the minimum 
wage profile. 
 
[Please insert Table 3.2] 
 
 Based on Table 3.2, we observe that, among the employed persons who answered the question 
regarding their income, 23.99% are getting paid at or less than the minimum wage. As for the 
demographical characteristics, it seems that the minimum wage profile refers to a woman, younger than 
45 years old who has attended at most secondary education (more than 45% of this group is getting paid 
with a minimum wage); however, a man, older than 45 years old who has attended at least a secondary 
education level earns more than the minimum wage (less than 10% of this group is getting paid with a 
minimum wage). Among regions, we do not observe high variation. Regarding the employment 
characteristics, self-employees and family workers did not answer this question, while 88.98% of part-
time employees are getting paid the minimum wage. Finally, the sectors with the highest ratio of 
employees paid with the minimum wage (more than 40%) are primary sector, administrative and 
supporting activities, accommodation and food, and other services. 
 Figure 3.3 below displays the evolution of the employment rate of the minimum wage profile 
(treatment group) and the non-minimum wage profile (control group). 
 
[Please insert Figure 3.3] 
 
5 Perhaps, it is difficult to completely compare the effects of these two reforms due to the following 
reasons. The first reason is that the change of the minimum wage is not the same (22% drop in the first 
and 11% rise in the second reform). The second reason is associated with the different data availability 
(after 2019, we have only one year). 
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 With the blue solid line, we display the treatment group, while the red dashed line depicts the 
control group. We clearly observe that in the pre-reform period both lines are mainly synchronized (run 
in parallel); however, after one year from the imposition of the first reform, the employment rate of the 
treatment group starts to increase, while that of the control group seems to remain unchanged for almost 
three years. As for the post-2019 period, a significant drop of the employment rate of the treatment 
group takes place; instead, it seems that the employment rate of the control group again remains 
unchanged. 
 
2.4. Specifying the research questions and the empirical model 
 The previous statistical and graphical analysis of the cross-sectional dataset helped us to understand 
how the employment rates of the treatment and the control groups have been affected by the minimum 
wage reforms in 2012 and 2019, respectively. In this respect, it is quite important to specify to what 
extent each reform may influence the relative change of the employment, in Greek labor market, 
between the treatment and the control groups. Thus, empirical applications will be presented below in 
an attempt to enlighten how the minimum wage reforms may be associated with two worst-case 
scenarios in the labor market: the job loss and the job search difficulty; both scenarios shed some light 
on the dynamic impact of reforms on the labor market.  
 Before proceeding to research questions, it is quite important to understand how to construct these 
two variables from our dataset. Since the current dataset cannot match the information of a specific agent 
of two separate periods, we use answers regarding the current and the previous year employment status. 
Thus, we could assume a job loss when people who worked in the previous year, they do not work in 
the current period; this variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 when a change in the employment 
status from employed to non-employed is reported, and the value 0 when the employment status remains 
unchanged (employed in both periods). As for the second variable, we consider a job search difficulty 
when individuals do not work in the current period and still seek for a job; this variable is an indicator 
that takes the value 1 when the job searching period lasts for more than 1 year (long-term 
unemployment) and the value 0 when this period is shorter than 1 year (short-term unemployment).6 
Table 3.3 below reports the descriptive statistics of both variables. 
 
[Please insert Table 3.3] 
 
 In order to estimate the impact of both reforms on the relative possibility of job loss and the job 
search difficulty between the treatment and the control groups, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
 
6 See an official definition from Eurostat in the following link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Long-term_unemployment 
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estimation strategy. Through this strategy, our aim is to look at the effect of the policy intervention (the 
minimum wage reform) by taking into consideration how the mean of a treatment group, in our case 
females, aged 15-44 who attended at most secondary education (minimum wage group), changes after 
the reform establishment and compare this change with a mean of a control group, in our case males, 
aged 45-64 who attended at least secondary education (non-minimum wage group). Figure 3.3 depicted 
that before the reform imposition, the employment rate of both groups was moving in an almost absolute 
parallel direction; instead, after the reform establishment, the employment rate of the treatment group 
changes a lot, while that of control group seems to be unchanged. 
 Having discussed the empirical strategy, the likelihood of an individual i reporting a change in 
his/her employment status or a difficulty to find a new job can be described as below: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽)                                                                                                             (1) 
where variable Y takes the value 1 when a job loss is reported, i.e., when the previous period’s status 
was employed and changes to either unemployed or inactive in the current period and the value 0 when 
the previous period’s status was employed and does not change, 
or 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑌𝑖𝑡′ = 𝑐|𝑋𝑖𝑡′ ) = 𝐹′(𝑋𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽′)                                                                                                          (2) 
where variable 𝑌′ takes the value 1 when job search difficulty is reported, i.e., the job searching period 
lasts for more than 1 year and the value 0 when this period is shorter than 1 year, for those individuals 
that are non-employed in the current period and still seek for a job. 
F and 𝐹′ are the standard logistic cumulative distribution functions, and X is a set of predictors reported 
below and refers to the 2012 reform: 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝟙[𝑡>2012]𝑡 + 𝛽2𝟙[𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝟙[𝑡>2012]𝑡 ∗ 𝟙[𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖        (3) 
where 𝟙[𝑡>2012]𝑡 is an indicator taking the value 1 if the year is 2013 or 2014 (one or two years after the 
reform) and 0 if the year is 2010 or 2011 (one or two years before the reform), 𝟙[𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡]𝑖𝑡  is an 
indicator that takes the value 1 when an individual is included in the treatment group (female, younger 
than 45 years old who attended at most secondary education) and 0 when an individual is included in 
the control group (male, older than 45 years old who attended at least secondary education) in period t, 
Z is a vector of demographical characteristics (gender, educational level, region of residence).7 𝛽1 
coefficient refers to the control group and expresses the expected mean change in outcome from before 
to after the policy intervention, 𝛽2 coefficient refers to the period before the intervention and captures 
the estimated mean difference in outcome between the treatment and control groups and 𝛽3 is the 
 
7 In this analysis, we cannot include any employment-level characteristics (sector, job distinction or 
professional status) since we are interested both for employment and non-employment status. 
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coefficient of our interest that informs us whether the expected mean change in Y (outcome variable) 
from before to after the policy reform was different between the two groups. 
 As to the second reform, the only variable that changes now is the indicator 𝟙[𝑡>2019]𝑡 that takes 
the value 1 if the year is 2020 (one year after the reform) and 0 if the year is 2017 or 2018 (one or two 
years before the reform). The relation is presented below: 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽′ = 𝛽0′ + 𝛽1′𝟙[𝑡>2019]𝑡 + 𝛽2′ 𝟙[𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3′ 𝟙[𝑡>2019]𝑡 ∗ 𝟙[𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡]𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4′𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖     (4) 
 
 3. Empirical results 
 This section presents the main results of this study. In particular, an official minimum wage 
reduction (2012 minimum wage reform) and an increase (2019 minimum wage reform), respectively, 
will be tested in order to find to what extent these changes in the minimum wage may affect or not the 
relative possibilities of job loss and job search difficulty between the treatment and the control groups. 
3.1. The relative possibility of job loss 
 Table 4.1 below presents the difference-in-difference estimation results of eqs. (1) and (3) and 
displays the odds ratio of the impact of both reforms on the possibility of job loss8. The dependent 
variable is an indicator which takes the value 1 if the individual reports that in the current period is either 
unemployed or inactive and in the previous period was employed, and the value 0 when the individual 
does not lose his/her job in the current period. 
 
[Please insert Table 4.1] 
 
 Columns (1) – (4) refer to 2012 minimum wage reform and columns (5) – (8) display the estimation 
results concerning 2019 reform. Briefly, it seems that only an increase in the minimum wage changes 
the relative possibility of job loss between the treatment and the control group, after the policy 
intervention. 
 Column (1) presents the estimates of the impact of the first reform without including any control 
variables. In this case, we observe that the relative possibility of job loss is strongly insignificant between 
the treatment group and the control group, after one or two years from the imposition of the minimum 
wage reduction. In this case, the possibility of job loss is increased by 17% for the control group when 
a minimum wage reform is established. Finally, the relative possibility of job loss, before the 
establishment of this reform, is increased by 54% for the treatment group in relation to the control group. 
We further proceed to column (2) in which the estimation results do not differ significantly even though 
2 demographical characteristics (control variables) are included, i.e., the educational level and the region 
 
8 Odds ratio is a ratio of likelihoods (an event to be occurred in terms of an event not to be occurred). 
Thus, when the odds ratio is higher than 1 increases the possibility an outcome to be happened, given 
an initial assumption; when the odds ratio is less than 1, this possibility decreases. To calculate the 
possibility, we simply subtract a given odds ratio from one. 
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of residence9, 10. Regarding the odds ratios of the control variables, the possibility of job loss is lower 
than 32% and 86% for individuals with primary or tertiary, and post-tertiary education, respectively 
compared to those with secondary education. Finally, decreased possibility (either significant or not) is 
reported, in almost all cases except for Macedonia, for individuals who live out of Attica compared to 
those live in Attica. To get a better insight of the results in column (2), columns (3) and (4) assume that 
the dependent variable takes now the value 0 when the current employment status is unemployed and 
inactive, respectively. The estimation results in column (3) do not change significantly compared to 
those of column (2); similarly, in column (4), the main result does not change, i.e., the difference-in-
difference estimator is completely insignificant. 
 With a similar way, we present the estimation results that are associated with the effect of 2019 
minimum wage increase in columns (5) – (8). Column (5), without including any control variables, 
shows that the relative possibility of job loss is increased by 27% after one year from this reform 
establishment between the treatment and the control groups. The possibility is increased by 39% for the 
control group when a minimum wage reform is established and the relative possibility of job loss is 
increased by 128% between the treatment group and the control group before the reform. Likewise, 
column (6) reports similar coefficients to those presented in column (5). In the same way with columns 
(3) and (4), we report estimates for the 2019 reform in columns (7) and (8), respectively. In this regard, 
we find an insignificant relative possibility of job loss for unemployed and a strongly significant one for 
inactive population; we find that this possibility is increased by 77%, after one year from the reform 
introduction, when the treatment group is considered. The rest of coefficients keep the same sign with 
those in column (6). 
 To test the robustness of our results, Table A1 in the Appendix replicates all columns of Table 4.1 
by including time and age fixed effects. Results remain almost unchanged, especially those of the 
difference-in-difference estimator. 
 In conclusion, a rise in the statutory minimum wage matters causing an increase in the relative 
possibility of job loss between the treatment and the control groups. This possibility is getting much 
higher when an individual is inactive in the current period. Regarding the decrease of the minimum 
wage, it seems that not to be an issue. Finally, the possibility of job loss drops for individuals with 
tertiary or post-tertiary education compared to those with secondary education level. 
 
3.2. The relative possibility of job search difficulty 
 To answer this question, we estimate eqs. (2) and (4) by putting emphasis on the odds ratios of the 
impact of both reforms on the possibility of job search difficulty. The dependent variable is an indicator, 
 
9 We also include the gender; however, it is omitted because of the collinearity with the dependent 
variable. 
10 For each one of these groups, the most populous value is used for reference; in education, the 
secondary education is used and in region of residence, Attica is used, respectively. 
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for non-employed individuals in the current period, which takes the value 1 if the individual seeks for a 
job for more than 12 months and the value 0 when the searching period lasts for less than 12 months. 
 
[Please insert Table 4.2] 
 
 Columns (1) and (2) present the impact of 2012 minimum wage reform and columns (3) and (4) 
the relevant impact of 2019 reform on the possibility of job search difficulty. In brief, it seems that only 
the official minimum wage reduction differentiates the possibility of job search difficulty between the 
treatment and the control groups. 
 Column (1) displays the effect, after the introduction of the first reform, without including any 
control variables, on the relative possibility of job search difficulty; this possibility is found to be 
decreased by 36%. In this respect, the possibility of job search difficulty is more than doubled for the 
control group when a minimum wage reform is established; additionally, the relative possibility of job 
search difficulty, before the establishment of this reform, is increased by 28% for the treatment group 
in relation to the control group. Proceeding to column (2), we observe that the main results remain almost 
unchanged; in this case, we include a number of control variables. We found that the possibility of job 
search difficulty increases for individuals with no school attainment or primary education compared to 
those individuals with secondary education. Finally, it seems that the impact on this possibility is 
increased for individuals living in the mainland and is reduced for those living in islands compared to 
Attica’s inhabitants. We continue with the identification of the impact of the last reform on the relative 
possibility of job search difficulty. In columns (3) and (4), the coefficient of our interest (difference-in-
difference estimator) is shown a completely statistically insignificant impact. 
 
4. Robustness analysis 
 In the current section, we will test the robustness of the estimation results of Section 4 by using 
sub-groups of the treatment and the control groups. 
 
4.1. A closer look to very young workers 
 In Section 3.2, we have discussed that the 2012 minimum wage reform reduced differentially the 
minimum wage for workers below and above 25 years old. Thus, our aim is to test to what extent a 
higher cut of the minimum wage for the age group 15-24 years old may affect differently the baseline 
results of Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Table 5.1 below provides the empirical results. 
 
[Please insert Table 5.1] 
 
 In Table 5.1, we replicate the empirical results of column (2) in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Columns (1) 
and (2) present the relative possibility of job loss and columns (3) and (4) display the relative possibility 
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of job search difficulty. Additionally, columns (1) and (3) assume that the treatment group is a female, 
aged 15-24 years old who attended at most secondary education; columns (2) and (4) consider that the 
treatment group is a female, aged 25-44 years old who completed at most the secondary education. For 
all cases, the control group remains the same with that of Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (male aged 45-64 who 
completed at least the secondary education level). 
 The empirical results show that the relative possibility of job loss, among the treatment and the 
control group for both cases, is not affected by the establishment of the 2012 reform, as in Table 4.1. 
However, we observe that after the increase of the minimum wage (2019 reform), the relative possibility 
of job search difficulty is reduced by 52% and 30%, i.e., more when we include in the treatment group 
only 15-24 years old workers; this possibility had been reduced by 35% in the baseline results (see Table 
4.1) that lies between 30% and 52%. The rest of coefficients are quite similar to those in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2, respectively. 
 
4.2. The initial job status 
 The database gives us important information regarding the previous year job status and sector for 
each respondent. In this section, we replicate the estimation results of column (6) of Table 4.1 (the 
estimation results after the imposition of 2019 reform) and delve more into these effects by adding an 
additional feature (employment characteristic) in the existing treatment group (female, aged 15-44 who 
attended at most secondary education). Table 5.2 below presents the estimation results of the relative 
possibility of job loss between the treatment and control groups after the establishment of 2019 
minimum wage reform. 
 
[Please insert Table 5.2] 
 
 For all cases of Table 5.2, the dependent variable is the relative possibility of job loss between the 
treatment and the control groups after the establishment of 2019 reform. Columns (1) and (2) assume 
that the treatment group is a female, aged 15-44 who completed at most the secondary education and 
the previous year job status is either self-employed or employee, respectively; the control group is now 
a male, aged 45-64 who attended at least the secondary education and the previous year job status is not 
self-employed (column (1)) or not employee (column (2)). Column (3) uses an extra feature in the 
treatment group the previous year involvement in one of the four minimum wage-intensive sectors 
(accommodation and food, primary sector administrative and supporting activities and other services); 
the control group refers to a male, aged 45-64 who attended at least the secondary education and the 
previous year job sector is not one of the minimum wage-intensive sectors. 
 The empirical results indicate that the relative possibility of job loss, among the treatment and the 
control group, is increased by more than 100% by the establishment of 2019 reform when we include 
an extra feature in the treatment group either the previous year job status to be employee or the previous 
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year job sector to be one of the four minimum wage-intensive sectors; this possibility is much higher 
compared to that displayed in column (6) of Table 4.1. The rest of coefficients carry the expected sign. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Are the relative effects between low-wage and high-wage employees on unemployment 
heterogenous when two different minimum wage reforms are introduced? To answer this question, we 
used survey data from the Greek labor market over the period between 2010 and 2020 for all respondents 
aged between 15 and 64 years old and a dynamic analysis with probit models by implementing a 
difference-in-difference estimation strategy which uncovers the differentiated impact of minimum wage 
reforms between the two groups. We thus showed that, among the two groups, a minimum wage increase 
is followed by a drop in the relative possibility of job loss, while the relative possibility of job search 
difficulty is negatively affected by a minimum wage cut. The former impact is getting worse for 
employees who engaged in a minimum wage-intensive sector in the previous year and are now inactive, 
while the latter effect is reinforced for very young workers. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the employment 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Whole sample 220,419 53.68 3.32 48.93 58.94 
Gender         
   Male 127,435 63.25 4.24 57.56 70.85 
   Female 92,984 44.48 2.69 40.33 48.29 
Age groups      
   15-29 27,381 30.34 4.39 25.00 38.78 
   30-44 88,118 70.22 3.58 65.11 76.20 
   45-64 104,920 54.17 3.32 48.94 58.53 
Educational level      
   No school 563 23.31 4.44 15.07 29.52 
   Primary 37,013 46.50 3.40 42.29 52.57 
   Secondary  117,940 49.59 3.41 44.59 55.44 
   Tertiary 57,308 70.50 3.80 65.94 77.83 
   Post-tertiary 7,595 82.39 2.36 77.87 88.73 
Region (NUTS 2)      
   Eastern Macedonia-Thrace 17,601 53.51 2.96 47.65 57.28 
   Central Macedonia 32,740 50.25 3.27 44.61 54.96 
   Western Macedonia 6,621 49.36 3.43 43.71 56.09 
   Epirus 13,276 52.38 4.28 46.56 60.33 
   Thessaly 13,823 55.44 3.03 51.13 61.25 
   Ionian Islands 6,416 60.60 3.54 53.16 65.88 
   Western Greece 14,293 50.73 3.66 44.70 57.58 
   Sterea Hellas 13,892 52.93 3.78 46.66 59.02 
   Attica 54,459 53.62 3.66 48.13 58.68 
   Peloponnese 16,653 58.62 3.31 54.63 63.85 
   Northern Aegean 5,602 55.07 4.42 47.65 60.69 
   Southern Aegean 6,589 58.13 5.31 45.86 65.72 
   Crete 18,454 57.60 4.39 51.69 63.54 
Job distinction      
    Full-time 202,744 92.00 0.96 90.85 93.53 
   Part-time 17,675 8.00 0.92 6.47 9.15 
      
 18 
Professional status      
   Employees 134,383 60.99 1.26 58.70 63.46 
  Self-employees 74,513 34.00 0.99 32.27 35.54 
  Family workers 11,523 5.01 0.73 3.91 6.10 
Sectors      
   Primary sector 37,090 16.89 1.00 15.27 18.23 
   Processing 20,712 9.45 0.75 8.70 10.92 
   Energy 3,191 1.45 0.10 1.30 1.58 
   Construction 11,287 5.51 1.54 3.84 7.94 
   Trade 37,937 17.22 0.32 16.50 17.76 
   Transport 9,837 4.47 0.21 4.27 4.98 
   Accommodation 19,550 9.04 1.23 7.36 10.83 
   Information 3,573 1.64 0.17 1.39 1.91 
   Financial 4,548 2.09 0.25 1.64 2.49 
   Prof-Tech 10,379 4.72 0.19 4.45 5.13 
   Support 4,231 1.95 0.25 1.50 2.24 
   Public admin. 18,871 8.57 0.29 8.11 9.17 
   Education 17,354 7.89 0.33 7.47 8.61 
   Human health 12,386 5.63 0.23 5.24 6.15 
   Entertainment 2,506 1.14 0.08 1.02 1.28 
   Other 6,967 3.22 0.44 2.56 3.80 
Notes: For all demographical characteristics, the employment rate has been computed as the ratio of 
number of employed to population of each group. However, for job distinction, professional status and 

















Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of the minimum wage profile 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Whole sample 23,459 23.99 3.87 19.06 34.70 
Gender         
   Male 9,834 18.59 3.81 13.98 29.69 
   Female 13,625 30.69 4.49 25.16 41.01 
Age groups      
   15-29 7,420 48.30 6.28 37.13 67.97 
   30-44 9,981 22.91 4.84 17.57 37.01 
   45-64 6,058 15.82 2.80 12.04 23.51 
Educational level      
   No school 106 64.54 10.33 37.50 77.78 
   Primary 4,029 40.58 6.70 32.19 56.89 
   Secondary  15,006 28.79 4.91 22.55 41.58 
   Tertiary 4,061 12.88 2.37 9.21 19.77 
   Post-tertiary 257 8.22 3.66 2.94 15.94 
Region (NUTS 2)      
   Eastern Macedonia-Thrace 1,653 25.14 5.70 18.15 39.74 
   Central Macedonia 3,830 24.78 5.76 18.13 44.84 
   Western Macedonia 678 23.70 4.61 19.42 39.51 
   Epirus 1,220 23.81 7.57 16.21 46.71 
   Thessaly 1,515 26.78 4.67 20.29 42.86 
   Ionian Islands 530 23.21 7.29 8.49 39.56 
   Western Greece 1,217 24.97 7.41 14.66 55.56 
   Sterea Hellas 1,391 23.41 3.69 14.58 31.68 
   Attica 7,064 23.80 3.16 18.44 28.57 
   Peloponnese 1,523 29.56 9.27 19.22 55.19 
   Northern Aegean 434 22.45 8.51 10.97 36.59 
   Southern Aegean 513 21.03 6.95 8.50 32.41 
   Crete 1,891 23.76 4.32 17.76 33.22 
Job distinction      
    Full-time 15,618 18.33 4.71 11.51 29.01 
   Part-time 7,841 88.98 2.28 83.65 93.28 
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Professional status      
   Employees 23,459 23.99 3.87 19.06 34.70 
  Self-employees - - - - - 
  Family workers - - - - - 
Sectors      
   Primary sector 1,503 46.53 8.56 29.84 63.87 
   Processing 2,399 22.27 5.54 15.57 41.28 
   Energy 262 13.32 5.33 5.06 25.00 
   Construction 1,569 33.88 8.10 23.87 50.00 
   Trade 5,237 35.20 6.84 25.79 51.48 
   Transport 560 12.58 2.60 7.06 17.74 
   Accommodation 3,451 41.66 7.97 30.61 67.42 
   Information 340 15.50 2.18 9.94 20.00 
   Financial 182 7.16 3.53 4.18 18.18 
   Prof-Tech 744 25.75 4.84 18.99 42.68 
   Support 1,110 45.54 5.47 38.15 55.84 
   Public admin. 805 6.44 2.17 2.88 12.07 
   Education 1,679 14.06 2.05 11.62 20.65 
   Human health 1,132 15.29 3.22 10.71 23.44 
   Entertainment 390 32.10 4.98 21.70 40.91 
   Other 2,096 58.91 9.03 40.21 67.11 
Notes: The minimum wage profile refers to all respondents who answered the question regarding the 
monthly payment; among them, those who get paid at or less than the minimum wage are included in 
this table. 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of job loss and job search difficulty 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Job loss 76,592 0.05 0.22 0 1 
   Yes 4,170 - - - - 
   No 72,422 - - - - 
Job search difficulty 20,206 0.69 0.47 0 1 
   Yes 13,812 - - - - 
   No 6,394 - - - - 
Note: For job loss, “Yes” is displayed when an individual was employed in the previous period and non-
employed in the current period; “No” presents the cases when the previous period’s status was employed 
and does not change in the current period. For job search difficulty, “Yes” refers to those observations 
that the searching period lasts for more than 1 year, while “No” indicates that this period is shorter than 
1 year. 
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Table 4.1: The job loss 
  2012 reform  2019 reform 
 Non-employed Unemployed Inactive  Non-employed Unemployed Inactive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
After reform 1.17** 1.18** 1.36*** 1.05  1.39*** 1.38*** 1.22 1.57*** 
 (2.31) (2.46) (3.00) (0.57)  (3.26) (3.19) (1.41) (3.13) 
Treatment group 1.54*** 1.42*** 2.48*** 0.54***  2.28*** 1.97*** 2.49*** 1.24 
 (6.82) (5.18) (9.94) (-5.31)  (9.20) (7.05) (7.55) (1.35) 
After reform * Treatment group 0.92 0.91 0.81 0.93  1.27* 1.27* 1.13 1.77*** 
 (-0.87) (-1.01) (-1.64) (-0.45)  (1.67) (1.67) (0.64) (2.59) 
No school attainment   0.80 1.05    3.04* 4.89**  
  (-0.29) (0.07)    (1.76) (2.49)  
Primary education  0.68*** 0.67*** 0.78   1.05 0.87 1.44 
  (-3.34) (-3.06) (-1.08)   (0.26) (-0.59) (1.36) 
Tertiary education  0.68*** 0.43*** 0.92   0.63*** 0.45*** 0.85 
  (-4.95) (-6.43) (-0.86)   (-3.71) (-4.18) (-0.96) 
Post-tertiary education  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15***   0.56** 0.33** 0.87 
  (-3.85) (-2.76) (-2.66)   (-2.18) (-2.45) (-0.41) 
Eastern Macedonia-Thrace  1.16 0.85 1.84***   1.03 0.81 1.48* 
  (1.45) (-1.18) (4.15)   (0.22) (-1.15) (1.84) 
Central Macedonia  1.14* 1.09 1.25*   1.10 1.00 1.29 
  (1.82) (0.97) (1.89)   (0.79) (0.02) (1.35) 
Western Macedonia  1.01 1.02 0.99   1.29 0.88 2.09*** 
  (0.04) (0.09) (-0.04)   (1.30) (-0.47) (2.70) 
Epirus  0.88 0.89 0.87   1.34* 1.33 1.38 
  (-1.18) (-0.93) (-0.79)   (1.75) (1.41) (1.16) 
Thessaly  0.85 0.70** 1.14   1.22 0.91 1.86*** 
  (-1.48) (-2.42) (0.76)   (1.27) (-0.46) (2.68) 
Ionian Islands  0.56*** 0.51*** 0.65   0.64* 0.31*** 1.33 
  (-3.00) (-2.72) (-1.40)   (-1.94) (-2.99) (0.95) 
Western Greece  0.91 0.89 0.97   1.04 1.19 0.73 
  (-0.83) (-0.92) (-0.17)   (0.23) (0.94) (-1.00) 
Sterea Hellas  0.85 0.69*** 1.17   0.96 0.90 1.10 
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  (-1.55) (-2.72) (1.03)   (-0.22) (-0.52) (0.36) 
Peloponnese  0.68*** 0.58*** 0.87   0.70** 0.40*** 1.31 
  (-3.62) (-3.92) (-0.81)   (-2.12) (-3.62) (1.19) 
Northern Aegean  0.76 0.66* 0.97   1.51** 1.35 1.87** 
  (-1.59) (-1.87) (-0.12)   (2.19) (1.23) (2.17) 
Southern Aegean  0.80 0.65** 1.15   1.36* 1.41* 1.26 
  (-1.35) (-2.02) (0.56)   (1.82) (1.71) (0.78) 
Crete  0.73*** 0.76** 0.66**   0.92 0.72* 1.33 
  (-3.12) (-2.34) (-2.27)   (-0.61) (-1.69) (1.30) 
Constant 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 (-63.05) (-42.38) (-38.58) (-35.31)  (-55.41) (-34.07) (-30.47) (-27.27) 
          
Observations 30,675 30,675 29,968 29,449   19,717 19,717 19,361 19,189 
Notes: The dependent variable “job loss” is an indicator that takes the value 1 when the previous period’s employment status was employed changing to a non-
employed status (unemployed or inactive) in the current period and the value 0 when the employed status of the previous period does not change in the current 
period. The treatment group refers to females aged 15-44 who attended at most secondary education. Columns (1) and (5) report the estimation results without 
control variables, while in columns (2) and (6), we add them. Further, in columns (3) and (7), the dependent variable takes the value 1 when the previous period’s 
status was employed and the current status is unemployed, while in columns (4) and (8) the current status changes to inactive. The reference group for educational 
level is the secondary education and for region of residence is Attica. 
(*), (**), (***) are significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively and t-values are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.2: The job search difficulty 
  2012 reform  2019 reform 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
           
After reform 3.30*** 3.29***  0.82 0.90 
 (11.67) (11.51)  (-1.60) (-0.82) 
Treatment group 1.28*** 1.24**  0.76*** 0.76*** 
 (2.80) (2.28)  (-3.30) (-2.99) 
After reform * Treatment group 0.64*** 0.65***  0.86 0.93 
 (-3.89) (-3.68)  (-0.99) (-0.46) 
No school attainment   2.39**   1.61 
 
 (2.03)   (0.89) 
Primary education  1.33***   1.30* 
 
 (3.24)   (1.71) 
Tertiary education  0.96   0.94 
 
 (-0.31)   (-0.35) 
Post-tertiary education  2.74   1.33 
  (1.63)   (0.69) 
Eastern Macedonia-Thrace  1.11   0.72** 
 
 (0.95)   (-2.37) 
Central Macedonia  1.35***   0.71*** 
 
 (4.01)   (-3.12) 
Western Macedonia  1.34**   0.73 
 
 (2.10)   (-1.64) 
Epirus  1.34***   0.97 
 
 (2.73)   (-0.16) 
Thessaly  1.03   0.71** 
 
 (0.23)   (-2.11) 
Ionian Islands  0.39***   0.19*** 
 
 (-5.23)   (-8.28) 
Western Greece  1.34***   0.80 
 
 (2.79)   (-1.54) 
Sterea Hellas  1.45***   0.79 
 
 (3.53)   (-1.40) 
Peloponnese  1.45***   0.86 
 
 (3.31)   (-0.87) 
Northern Aegean  1.06   0.65** 
 
 (0.31)   (-2.06) 
Southern Aegean  0.33***   0.17*** 
 
 (-6.72)   (-10.82) 
Crete  0.66***   0.34*** 
  (-4.35)   (-7.81) 
Constant 0.91 0.84**  3.46*** 4.89*** 
 (-1.23) (-2.00)  (17.82) (15.56) 
      
Observations 8,026 8,026   4,628 4,628 
Notes: The dependent variable “job search difficulty” is an indicator that takes the value 1 when the 
searching period for a new job lasts for more than 1 year (long-term unemployment) and the value 0 
when this period is shorter than 1 year (short-term unemployment). As in Table 4.1, the reference group 
for educational level is the secondary education and for region of residence is Attica. 





Table 5.1: A differential effect between young and very young workers 
  Job loss   Job search difficulty 
 15-24 25-44  15-24 25-44 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
After reform 1.19** 1.19**  3.30*** 3.30*** 
 (2.48) (2.49)  (11.57) (11.55) 
Treatment group 2.33*** 1.33***  0.89 1.40*** 
 (6.65) (4.02)  (-1.02) (3.49) 
After reform * Treatment group 1.03 0.91  0.48*** 0.70*** 
 (0.16) (-0.92)  (-4.83) (-2.96) 
Constant 0.07*** 0.06***  0.87 0.86 
 (-37.31) (-41.82)  (-1.45) (-1.62) 
      
Observations 18,319 29,581   3,235 6,703 
Control variables      
    Educational level Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
    Residence area Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the relative possibility of “job loss” after the 
establishment of 2012 minimum wage reform; in columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the 
relative possibility of “job search difficulty” after the establishment of 2019 reform. In columns (1) and 
(3), the treatment group includes only the age group 15-24; the rest of characteristics remain unchanged 
(female who attended at most secondary education). In columns (2) and (4), the age group 25-44 is 
included. As in Table 4.1, the reference group for educational level is the secondary education and for 
region of residence is Attica. 




Table 5.2: The relative possibility of job loss and the initial job status (2019 reform) 
  Job status   Minimum wage-intensive 
 Self-employed Employee  job sector 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
After reform 1.61*** 0.74  1.19 
 (4.14) (-1.27)  (1.47) 
Treatment group 0.42*** 4.99***  1.88*** 
 (-3.21) (10.49)  (4.86) 
After reform * Treatment group 0.70 2.35***  2.12*** 
 (-0.76) (3.28)  (4.05) 
Constant 0.05*** 0.01***  0.04*** 
 (-24.37) (-24.80)  (-29.16) 
     
Observations 8,900 10,383  12,966 
Control variables     
    Educational level Yes Yes  Yes 
    Residence area Yes Yes  Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the “job loss”; in columns (1) and (2), the previous period status is 
self-employed and employee, respectively. Column (3) considers as treatment group a female, aged 15-
44 who attended at most secondary education and involved, in the previous year, in one of the most 
minimum wage-intensive sectors (accommodation and food, primary sector administrative and 
supporting activities and other services). As in Table 4.1, the reference group for educational level is the 
secondary education and for region of residence is Attica. 




Figure 3.1: The evolution of the nominal minimum wage in Greece 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The evolution of the total employment rate in Greece 
 
Note: The employment rate has been calculated by dividing the number of employed persons with the 








Figure 3.3: The evolution of the employment rate per group 
 
Note: The graph plots the employment rate of treatment and control groups. The former group includes 
all females, aged 15-44 who attended at most secondary education; the latter group refers to males, aged 





Table A1: The job loss with fixed effects 
  2012 reform  2019 reform 
 Non-employed Unemployed Inactive  Non-employed Unemployed Inactive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                    
After reform 1.24** 1.27*** 1.40*** 1.19  1.26** 1.24* 1.15 1.34* 
 (2.45) (2.67) (2.67) (1.41)  (2.10) (1.93) (0.93) (1.77) 
Treatment group 0.77 0.66 2.12 0.42*  3.53*** 2.96*** 11.64*** 1.44 
 (-0.63) (-1.04) (1.20) (-1.67)  (3.39) (2.86) (4.75) (0.63) 
After reform * Treatment group 0.98 0.96 0.85 0.99  1.31* 1.32* 1.13 1.89*** 
 (-0.25) (-0.46) (-1.24) (-0.08)  (1.87) (1.92) (0.65) (2.88) 
Constant 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.02*** 0.10***  0.07*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 
 (-25.09) (-20.18) (-18.25) (-17.41)  (-22.80) (-17.50) (-14.70) (-14.44) 
          
Observations 30,675 30,675 29,968 29,449   19,717 19,717 19,361 19,189 
Age effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects (year) Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable “job loss” is an indicator that takes the value 1 when the previous period’s employment status was employed changing to a non-
employed status (unemployed or inactive) in the current period and the value 0 when the employed status of the previous period does not change in the current 
period. The treatment group refers to females aged 15-44 who attended at most secondary education. Columns (1) and (5) report the estimation results without 
control variables, while in columns (2) and (6), we add them. Further, in columns (3) and (7), the dependent variable takes the value 1 when the previous period’s 
status was employed and the current status is unemployed, while in columns (4) and (8) the current status changes to inactive.  
All cases include age and time fixed effects, and control variables (educational level, residence area). The reference group for educational level is the secondary 
education and for region of residence is Attica. 
(*), (**), (***) are significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively and t-values are reported in parenthesis. 
